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Virtual consultation with co-facilitators of the Pact for the Future on Pact Rev-2

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My name is Javier Surasky. I’m the head of the International Cooperation Department at the Institute of International Relations of the Universidad Nacional de La Plata, in Argentina.

The second revision of the Pact for the Future introduces several changes. Let me highlight some areas of progress and some of concern.

**An extended use of the word “relevance”, before “stakeholders”, and “bodies”, without an indication that helps to decide what is “relevant”, opens an avenue for exclusion** from UN meetings and processes. For example, in Action 40 decision (a), the reference to a **“**systematic” youth engagement at the UN is erased, and youth participation in “***all*** United Nations bodies and processes” is replaced by “United Nations ***relevant*** bodies and processes.” Who will decide what is “relevant in each situation, on a case-by-case basis? Let me remind you that civil society participation in the Pact for the Future negotiations process has been seen as “not relevant” for some member states.

Important international agreements are not more referenced in the Rev-2. Even in **Chapter 1 on Poverty, Hunger, and Development Financing** two new actions focusing on poverty and hunger, brought to the table by the G77, contribute to better aligning the PFF with the 2030 Agenda, there are no mentions of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and the Paris Agreement and the Paris Agreement is barely mentioned. When referring to children in **Chapter 4** **on Youth and Future Generations**, the mention of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Rev-1 is erased. And those are only examples in a larger list of forgotten agreements directly linked to the Pact of the Future decisions.

**Chapter 2 on Peace, Security, and Multilateralism** reflects evolving priorities with new language on rebuilding trust, including actions on youth, maritime security, and compliance with the International Court of Justice decisions. However, the level of detail has been reduced in several areas, potentially hindering decisions’ implementation. It is difficult to contribute to this chapter without knowing which will be the outcome of the UN Security Council reform, the only issue that still lacks a wording proposal.

**In Chapter 3 on Human Rights and Digital Cooperation**, we need stronger language on Digital Technologies and AI for sustainable development to guide digital technology advances and deployment. **Chapter 4 on Youth and Future Generations** includes now more precise actions but the distinction among children, youth, and future generations as three different groups must be more precise and clear.

Both chapters 3 and 4 miss some of the most new and relevant language, specifically there not mention “climate justice” and “intergenerational justice”. A UN overemphasis on future generations and youth has left older persons at risk of being left behind, just now when we need their wisdom more than ever.

**Chapter 5 on Transforming Global Governance** is the weakest one. The inclusion of minimal details required to make decisions actionable is absent from the text. That is highly problematic, particularly when we pair it with Rev-2 notable regression in financing for development, an area in which almost every timeframe in Rev-1 has been erased because of mandate limits.

**There will only be more robust and effective multilateralism by reforming its key institutions and providing financial support to implement the required changes.**

Some of the most interesting proposals coming from civil society, academia, experts, and practitioners, such as the creation of a **UN Parliament** or **transforming the Trusteeship Council into a sustainable development implementation** body, have not found their way to the Pact.

**The establishment of a follow-up mechanism is a step in the right direction; however, the Pact for the Future must ensure that it will be aligned with those in the Declaration on Future Generations and the Global Digital Compact**. To be clear, we would not merge the three, but we should ensure that they work coherently and collaboratively. Besides, the Pact should establish the foundation operative elements for its follow-up mechanism to ensure that it responds to the commitments of democratic and broad participation, action orientation, and effectiveness that inform the document.

Even when **we can consider the Pact for the Future as a step forward**, it is still a shorter-than-required one. The Pact does not push forward enough for the inclusion of prospective methodologies for planning, future thinking for strategizing, an evidence-based approach for decision-making, and a multidisciplinary approach in decision implementation, elements that are so much needed in the UN structure. Only decision 70 (a) refers to this in a very general way.

The **potential contributions from the regions**, especially “localizing” a global agreement to help put it into action according to specific realities, are not considered.

**If the Pact for the Future is pretended to be the basis for a renewed international social contract, it falls short** of achieving that goal. The best we can expect is that the Pact would be the **starting point for a long-overdue multilateralism deep reform** process, which requires a Member States long-term view and a political will that we did not see in the SoTF negotiations.

To conclude, **we are not in the post-2030**. **Adopting a strong and actionable PFF is a way to fulfill existing undertakings to accelerate SDGs’ implementation**.

As we move forward, the real test will lie in translating the Pact decisions into meaningful actions. **Words alone do not change the word. Actions do**.